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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CoMmERCE CLAUSE-NAVIGABLE WATERS-LICENSE TO CONSTRUCT A DAM THEREIN.-The defendant

company is constructing a hydro-electric dam in the New River
above Radford, Virginia where it is a riparian owner. The New
River passes through Virginia and West Virginia. The Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1899 prohibits the construction of a dam in any
navigable water of the United States without the consent of Congress.' However, the Federal Water Power Act of 1920 created a
Commission with authority to license the construction of such dams
upon certain conditions-such as concern rates, accounts, control of
operation and acquisition of the project by the United States at the
expiration of the license. 2 The defendant refused a license containing the statutory provisions, on the ground that its project was not
within the Commission's jurisdiction, but was willing to accept a
"minor-part" license containing only such'terms as would protect the
United States' interests in navigation. This offer was rejected.
Thereafter, the United States commenced this suit to enjoin the construction of the dam otherwise than under a license from the Federal
Power Commission, and in the alternative for a mandatory order of
removal. It was alleged that the construction of the dam constituted
a violation of the above-mentioned federal statutes, for it would
obstruct and impair the navigability of the New, Kanawha and Ohio
Rivers, and it would affect the interests of interstate and foreign
commerce. The defendant denied the allegations by contending that
the New River was not navigable and that, even if it were, the said
conditions of the license are unrelated to navigation, are beyond the
power of the Commission and without the constitutional power of
Congress to authorize. The district court dismissed the bill,8 because
it found: that the New River was not navigable according to the test
enunciated in The Daniel Ball case,4 that the dam would not obstruct
STAT. 1151, 33 U. S. C. A. §§ 401, 403 (1899).
249 STAT. 838, 16 U. S. C. A. §791a (1935).
130

F. Supp. 83 (W. D. Va. 1938).
410 Wall. 557, 563 (U. S. 1870).
323

"... . Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which
are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they are used, or
are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary
modes of trade and travel on water. And they constitute navigable waters of
the United States within the meaning of the acts of Congress, in contradistinction from the navigable waters of the States, when they form in their ordinary
condition by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway
over which commerce is or may be carried on with other States or foreign
countries in the customary modes in which such commerce is conducted by
water."
The lower courts rejected the government's argument that the court should
consider the navigability question in the light of the effect of reasonable improvements on the waterway.
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the navigable capacity of any navigable river and that it would not
affect the interests of interstate commerce. The circuit court of
appeals, one judge dissenting, affirmed the decision of the district
courtY On certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States,
held, two judges dissenting, reversed. The evidence of actual use for
commerce and private purposes and of the feasibility of interstate use
after reasonable improvements of the obstructed portions proves that
the New River is navigable and, therefore, is subject to federal control"
and Congress may require a license with the statutory terms for the
construction of a dam therein. Also, when the navigability of a
waterway of the United States is in issue the Supreme Cotirt may
reconsider the facts found by the two courts to determine whether
the proper legal test was applied. United States v. Appalachian
Electric Power Co., -

U. S. -,

61 Sup. Ct. 291 (1940).

The commerce clause 6 implies the power of Congress to control
the navigable waters which are used or are capable of use in interstate commerce. 7 Formerly, the test of navigability applied by the
Supreme Court was that of the tidal flow,8 but the present rule is
navigability in fact. However, in determining whether the water
course is navigable in fact, the possibility that it may be made an
interstate avenue for commerce after reasonable improvements should
not be excluded. The commerce clause empowers Congress not only
to maintain and improve the navigability of such waterways 9 but also
to protect them against obstructions placed therein by any person or
state. It may prohibit or permit the use of or the construction or
maintenance of any structures in or across the navigable waters.' 0
This plenary power and the dominion of the United States over the
flow and energy of the navigable streams enables Congress to prescribe that as a condition to the maintenance and erection of a project
in its navigable waters that a license be procured from the proper
federal agency." It may, moreover, require that the license contain
certain conditions such as are involved in the instant case which are
unrelated to navigation, for the power of the legislature is "as broad
as the needs of commerce", and, in any event, its plenary power to
5 107 F. (2d) 769 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939).

6 U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power * * *
To regulate Commerce * * * among the several States").
7 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat 1, 189 (U. S. 1824) ; Leovy v. United States,
177 U. S. 621, 632, 20 Sup. Ct. 797, 801 (1900).
89 The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson, 10 Wheat. 428 (U. S. 1825).
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 56 Sup. Ct. 466
(1936).
10 Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & B. Bridge Co., 13 How. 518 (U. S. 1851);
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & B. Bridge Co., 18 How. 421 (U. S. 1855); Union
Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364, 27 Sup. Ct. 367 (1906); Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 32 Sup. Ct. 340 (1911) ; Sanitary District of
Chicago v. United States, 266 U. S. 405, 45 Sup. Ct. 176 (1924).
21 United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co., 174 U. S. 690, 707, 19 Sup.
Ct 770, 776 (1898); Greenleaf Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U. S. 251, 268,
35 Sup. Ct. 551, 557 (1915).
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exclude structures from the navigable streams authorizes such terms.
Furthermore, the provision that gives the United States an option to
acquire the licensed project and the riparian rights at less than a fair
value does not violate the "due process of law" clause, 12 because this
is part of the consideration that the licensee has to pay to procure the
privilege to construct and maintain its project in a place where it
could be forbidden absolutely, and the United States, having the
power to erect a structure in such waters, 13 may constitutionally
obtain one already built. Nor does such acquisition constitute an
invasion of the states' rights under the Tenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, since the federal government's action is
within the commerce clause. The dissenting opinion of the present
case is based essentially on the premises that the Supreme Court
should accept the factual findings concurred in by the two lower
courts and that it should adhere to the rule of The Daniel Ball case
without considering the possibility of improving the New River.
A.G.

PRIVILEGE OF DECLARING
of Wisconsin enacted a statute I which provided: "For the privilege of-declaring and receiving
dividends out of income derived from property located, and business
transacted, in this state there is hereby imposed a tax equal to two
and one-half per centum of the amount of such dividends declared
and paid by all corporations (foreign and local) . . ." The remaining provisions of the act refer to the method of computing and collecting the tax and are not pertinent to the issues here involved. The
defendant is a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the State
of Wisconsin. It receives income in that state, and after whatever
tax is levied upon its net profit is paid, such income is forwarded to
its home office (New York); from there it is employed in any way
the management sees fit; perhaps, some or all of it may be disbursed
as dividends. Whether the tax on the privilege of paying such dividends may apply to a foreign corporation licensed to do business in
Wisconsin without offending the due process clause 2 is the question
raised by this appeal. Held, four judges dissenting, the statute is
constitutional. The substantial privilege of carrying on business in
Wisconsin clearly supports the tax, and the fact that the tax is contingent upon events brought to pass without the state does not destroy
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TAX ON
DIVIDENDS-DUE PRocEss.-The State

22 U. S. CoxsT. AMEND. V.

13 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 56 Sup. Ct

466 (1936).

'Wis. Laws 1935, c. 505, § 3, as amended by Wis. Laws 1935, c. 552.
2 U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. XIV, § 1.

